Introduction
It has been argued that the appreciation of the RMB since 2005 is just the beginning of a necessary upward trend, given the belief that the currency is currently undervalued, by margins ranging from 'small' to as high as 50%.
i Expectations that China's underlying real exchange rate will appreciate in the future are based commonly on the Balassa (1964 ) -Samuelson (1964 hypothesis. This implies a positive relationship between economic growth and the real exchange rate, driven by productivity catch-up in developing countries' tradable sectors and, in association, rising prices in their non-traded sectors. Two suppositions are essential to the hypothesis. First, relative to foreign trading partners, productivity rises fastest in the traded goods sector and, second, due to associated wage pressure, there is relative inflation of non-traded service prices.
This paper offers evidence in support of these suppositions in the case of China, lending additional weight to the expectation that the real exchange rate should be appreciating. At the same time, however, it shows that there has been no significant long term appreciating trend from the early 1990s through 2006. Therein lays the puzzle. Its resolution requires the generalisation of the assumptions on which the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis is based; in particular, the relaxation of the assumption that the law of one price applies for all traded goods. This generalisation greatly broadens the set of determinants of the real exchange rate and it is to these that the paper then turns. It turns out that, while productivity changes are influential in the medium to long run, so also are labour force growth and trade reforms. In the short run movements in the real exchange rate prove to be dominated by financial flows on the balance of payments.
ii Thus, the net effect of China's rapid economic growth on its real exchange rate depends on the sources of that growth and the consequent pattern of endowment changes and sectoral distributions of productivity growth and tradability. Of considerable importance in resolving the puzzle is the short run impact of China's widening current account surplus, which stems from its extraordinarily large yet still rising saving rate.
The next section briefly reviews the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis and the evidence in support of its key suppositions, and then demonstrates its apparent inconsistency with the trend of China's real exchange rate. A more general treatment of real exchange rate determination is then offered in Section 3 and elasticities to various determinants are calculated using a simulation model of the global economy in Section 4. A final resolution of the puzzle is suggested in Section 5 and a discussion of the implications for Chinese macroeconomic policy is then provided in Section 6. General conclusions and policy implications are presented in Section 7.
Balassa-Samuelson: theory and evidence for China
If the nominal exchange rate, E, is defined as the number of units of foreign exchange obtained for a unit of the domestic currency, the real exchange rate, R e , can be defined correspondingly as the rate of exchange between the home product bundle and corresponding bundles produced abroad. It follows that the bilateral real exchange rate for a focus (home) country with foreign trading partner i can be approximated as the common currency ratio of the gross domestic product (GDP) prices (deflators) of the two countries, 
This is the fundamental relationship between the real and nominal exchange rates. Consider the case in which prices at home and abroad are measured in a common currency, the share of non-traded products in GDP, θ, is the same at home and abroad, prices are aggregated appropriately using a Cobb-Douglas index and the law of one price applies to all traded goods. The latter implies that trade is costless and undistorted, so that
Under these conditions, the real exchange rate becomes
From this, the key role of non-traded goods prices is clear. When prices are measured in a common currency, or relative to a common numeraire, it is the ratio of the home and foreign non-traded goods prices that matters in determining the real exchange rate.
To illustrate the associated dependence on productivity, imagine that labour is the single fixed factor and that the rates of output per worker in the home traded and non-traded sectors are A . The relationships between the wage rate and product prices in the traded and non-traded sectors follow from equating the wage in both sectors with the values of the marginal products of labour in each:
, from which it follows that the divergence in wage rates between trading partners depends only on their tradable productivities:
If the non-traded productivity level is the same in all trading partners (
By the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, if the focus country has higher tradable productivity growth, ˆT
T i
A A > , its real exchange rate must be appreciating. The hypothesis then implies that, if developing countries are poorer because their tradable labour productivity is lower, then comparatively rapid growth should cause real appreciations.
The supporting evidence for China:
The two key suppositions that are essential to the hypothesis are, first, that, productivity rises fastest in the traded goods sector and, second, due to associated wage pressure, that there is relative inflation of non-traded service prices. We examine these by estimating simple Solow residuals for the economy as a whole and for three sectors: 'Food', 'Industry' and 'Services'.
In doing so, we adjust the officially published urban employment data for underestimation, as discussed in Cai and Wang (2006) . iv The average annual changes in the Solow residuals for each sector that emerge from this analysis are given in Table 1 . These show strong productivity performance by the Chinese economy since the mid 1980s, with a slow-down in the 1998-2001 period associated with the East Asian financial crisis. Consistent with the first supposition, and with other studies by Lu (2006) and Fogel (2006) , productivity growth appears to have been strongest in the export orientated industrial sector and weakest in the largely non-traded service sector.
v The second supposition is also supported by the evidence, as shown in Figure 1 . The prices of construction and other services have clearly risen faster than the GDP price since 1990. On the (accurate) presumption that China's productivity growth is higher than that of its trading partners, this strongly supports a simultaneous real appreciation. Yet, as shown in Figure 2 , no such appreciating trend has emerged. It is this puzzle that we seek to resolve. We begin with a generalisation of the hypothesis via a relaxation of some of its key assumptions.
A Generalisation
The key assumptions of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis are indeed suspect. We offer a critique of each, as follows.
Tradable productivity gap:
During some periods and in some developing countries, productivity growth has been observed to be higher in the non-tradable sector, vi leading to
and tending to depreciate the real exchange rate. Modern transport, financial, health and education services offer considerable potential for productivity catch-up. Whatever the relative performance of China's services sector in the past, recent evidence suggests substantial potential for catch-up and accelerated productivity growth in the future (Ma 2006 whether the Chinese economy will run out of steam once the convergence in export productivity nears completion, or whether it will be able to 'discover' new products on world markets and enable export-led growth to continue. While such speculation suggests future real appreciations based on productivity growth in the tradable sector, considerable future growth could stem from productivity catch-up in the service sector-a depreciating force.
The fact that recent productivity growth in manufacturing has been associated with foreign direct investment (FDI) and that service FDI has begun to grow only recently, suggests that services productivity will be a major contributor to China's growth in the future. Clearly, the sectoral distribution of productivity gains is critical in determining the real exchange rate.
In turn, productivity differences across sectors will be affected by levels of education and training. Fogel (2006) predicts that investment in human capital has the potential to serve as China's key engine of economic growth for the next two decades, a point that is well recognised by China's leaders (as emphasised in the eleventh Five-Year Plan). He qualifies the impact of enhancing the quality of labour through education on the growth rate of per capita income and shows that increasing secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios has a sizeable impact on the growth of labour productivity and the per capita GDP growth rate. xi To the extent that services are skill intensive (as they are according to past data), this will boost performance in the service sector-again, tending to depreciate China's real exchange rate.
Of course, to the extent that structural changes lead to rapid upgrading in the skill intensity of tradables in the process of economic growth in China, as it has in other countries; this relationship will operate in reverse.
Allowing for failures of the law of one price for tradable goods, there are numerous other forces tending to depreciate the real exchange rate in the long term. During the past two decades one such force has been China's 'demographic dividend', stemming from the high proportion of working-aged people in the total population. This, according to Cai and Wang (2005) , accounted for about one-quarter of per capita GDP growth between 1980 and 2003. xii It has played a critical role in keeping wages and hence the real exchange rate low, thereby enabling the rapid expansion of labour-intensive manufactured exports. In the future, however, the ageing of the population and the consequent decline in the labour supply will have the opposite effect, placing upward pressure on real wages and the real exchange rate.
xiii Alternative population policies, such as the relaxation of the One Child Policy, clearly stand to affect economic growth via the labour supply, and therefore to impact on the real exchange rate as well.
The Balassa-Samuelson assumption that productivity gains translate into higher wages (Equations 1-3) is underpinned by the assumption of full employment and labour-market arbitrage. While Miyajima (2005) finds that this assumption is satisfied for his OECD sample, it is far from clear that it has also held for China in the past. Cai and Wang (2006) show that, during the period 1995-2002, average annual manufacturing wage growth was 11.6 per cent in China-below their estimate of productivity growth (12.2 per cent), a point that is also supported by Fan (2006) . And if, as noted above, rural labour is more mobile into some services than into manufacturing, the wage cost effect on services might have been yet smaller. Thus, labour mobility into the non-rural sectors could have offset the appreciating forces in recent decades.
Modelling the determinants of China's real exchange rate
Here we examine quantitatively the relationship between shocks associated with China's economic growth and its real exchange rate. To do this effectively, a numerical model is required that is global in scope and that incorporates the generalisations of the BalassaSamuelson assumptions discussed above. Recall that these included productivity growth in non-tradable as well as tradable sectors, departures from the law of one price for tradable goods, a more sophisticated representation of the labour market and an open capital account.
With these generalisations, almost all shocks to the economy have implications for the real exchange rate.
We use a model that offers these generalisations. Adapted from Shi (2007a, 2007b) , it is a multi-region, multi-product dynamic simulation model of the world economy. xiv In the version used, the world is subdivided into 14 regions ( To augment the model's characterisation of changes in labour supply and quality, it encompasses demographic and economic change. It tracks populations in four age groups, two genders and two skill categories: a total of 16 population groups in each of the 14 regions.
The skill subdivision is between production labour (unskilled) and professional labour (skilled). xvi Each age-gender-skill group is represented as a homogeneous sub-population with a group-specific birth and death rate, labour force participation rate and rates of immigration and emigration. Because the non-traded sector is relatively intensive in skill, trends in skill composition prove to be particularly important. These depend on the rate at which each region's education and social development institutions transform unskilled (production-worker) families into skilled (professional-worker) families. Each year a particular proportion of the population in each production-worker age-gender group is transferred to professional status. The initial values of these proportions depend on the regions' levels of development, the associated capacities of their education systems and the relative sizes of their production and professional labour forces. Rates of transformation change through time in response to corresponding changes in real per capita income and the skilled wage premium.
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The 16 age-gender-skill groups differ in their shares of regional disposable income, consumption preferences, saving rates and labour force participation behaviour. While the consumption-savings choice differs for each group, it is dependent for all on group-specific real per capita disposable income and the regional real lending rate. Governments are assumed to balance their budgets while saving and borrowing are undertaken by the private sector. The baseline scenario is a 'business-as-usual' projection of the global economy until 2030.
Our focus is on how shocks that enhance the rate of GDP growth impact on the real exchange rate. xviii The most significant of these are once-and-for-all productivity increases, skill transformation rate increases, interest premium decreases (increases in net financial inflows) and tariff decreases (increases in openness). In each case, we run a new simulation in which the determinant in question is shocked once and for all, as of 2005. We then extract the elasticity of China's real exchange rate to each shock, tracking the values through time to 2030. We focus on the bilateral real exchange rate, measured as in Equation (1), against the region 'North America', since this best parallels China's nominal exchange rate policy and the renminbi valuation debate. The results are summarised in Figure 3 .
Productivity growth increase
We first shock total factor productivity separately in each sector. The elasticity is the percentage departure of the projected real exchange rate or growth rate for each percentage per annum increase in total factor productivity. The overall rate of economic growth proves to be quite sensitive to such productivity shocks since the larger these are for a particular region, the larger is that region's marginal product of capital. The region therefore enjoys higher levels of investment and hence a double boost to its growth rate. Because 'industry' is by far the greatest contributor to China's trade its productivity is more significant for the real exchange rate than 'food'. The appreciating effects of tradable productivity increases are consistent with the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis and are, as expected, due to wage growth and relative service price inflation. They are bolstered in the short term by increased investment and hence greater net inflows on the capital account. In the long term, however, the enlargement of the industrial capital stock reduces costs and hence offsets the real exchange rate gains. Also, as expected from the dominance of non-traded sector prices in Equation (2), faster service productivity growth depreciates the real exchange rate-modestly in the early years but to a dominant extent in the long term, when it is reinforced by associated capital accumulation.
Skill acquisition rate increase
When the skill acquisition rate is increased in developing regions such as China, where the unskilled (or production) worker population is larger than its skilled (or professional) counterpart, the proportional boost to skilled workers is larger than the proportional loss of unskilled workers. The result is greater output and, other things being equal, a real depreciation. This tendency is enhanced by the fact that the services sector is comparatively skill intensive, so that the shock causes a relatively large boost to service output and hence a relatively large fall in the home service price (relative to North America). The result is a strong responsiveness of GDP growth to skill acquisition and a relatively large real depreciation in the long run. The elasticities in this case are percentage departures of the real exchange rate for each per cent of the production-worker (unskilled) population that is transformed each year. Defined this way, skill transformation places downward pressure on the real exchange rate of a magnitude similar to total factor productivity in services.
Interest premium decline (increased financial capital inflow)
In the short term, the decline in China's interest premium results in net capital inflows, which raises investment and therefore increases aggregate demand and the real exchange rate. A positive demand-driven effect is therefore expected in the first instance. In the long term, however, when the effect of the investment on the capital stock is realised, the supply side dominates. More abundant and hence cheaper capital reduces production costs, yielding a real depreciation. The elasticity-to-premium decline (financial capital inflow) is large and positive in the short term, with the lag to the switch in sign measuring at least 15 years.
Trade liberalisation (increased openness)
Trade liberalisation switches demand away from home-produced goods and services towards imported varieties. For a single region, the supply of goods and services from the much larger foreign market is more elastic than that of home varieties, constrained as they are by local factor supplies and technology. The effect of the demand switch, then, is to reduce the relative prices of the home varieties and hence to depreciate the real exchange rate. The elasticity of openness is constructed by dividing the percentage change in the real exchange rate by the percentage point change in the import penetration ratio (the ratio of the value of imports to the total value of domestic consumption). The shock on which it is based is a phased removal of all China's merchandise trade barriers over five years. xix The elasticity, also shown in Figure 3 , has the expected negative sign, and its magnitude grows through time.
The rise in its (negative) magnitude through time occurs because, even though the industries most affected by trade liberalisation are capital intensive, the broad group "industry" in the model is benefited overall, raising the return on physical capital and attracting additional investment. This apparent anomaly occurs because the "industry" aggregate produces goods that are differentiated from competing imports with the degree of differentiation limiting the extent of demand switching. At the same time this industry group is a large importer of intermediate inputs that are also industrial products. It turns out that the gains to the sector from cheaper intermediates outweigh the losses from import competition in final demand.
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The effects on GDP are positive, with the raised investment and capital growth tending to reduce costs further and hence to enlarge the negative elasticity through time.
Resolution
There is no doubt that the Balassa-Samuelson appreciating force of Section 2 has been in action in China. Our generalisations of their hypothesis allow consideration of countervailing forces, however, and it is these that must have prevented any significant real appreciation between the early 1990s and 2006. Although services productivity is shown in the previous section to be a strong depreciating force, the evidence of Section 2 suggests the net effect of productivity changes across China's sectors is appreciating. Other strong depreciating forces include skill acquisition, which gives an endowment boost to the services sector, trade reforms and financial flows on the balance of payments.
In the short to medium run the latter is the dominant such force -the expansion of net inflows on the financial and capital accounts is strongly appreciating. From Figure 4 , however, it is evident that, since the mid-1990s there has in fact been an expansion in net outflows on these accounts, and so the effect has been to apply downward pressure on China's real exchange rate. To see this, note that the equality of net flows on the capital account to the investment-saving gap follows from the standard aggregate expenditure and disposal identities. Expressing a widely held view outside China, Lardy (2006:85) argues that: 'As the world's second largest surplus country, China must allow its currency to appreciate against the dollar and it must take steps to allow a transition to a growth path driven more by domestic consumption than by further increases in its external surplus.'
Since the gross outflows on its capital account take the form of reserve accumulation, China, in combination with other Asian economies that are also raising reserves, has been accused of 'monetary mercantilism'. xxiii It is implied that reserve accumulation is chosen freely in order to keep the real exchange rate low. That this is unfair criticism is evident from the identities.
By definition, from Equation (4) The key to China's macroeconomic policy is the on-going program of reforms essential to financial and capital account liberalisation. The reason why the PBC sterilises foreign currency inflows net of import costs is because, short of these reforms, the Chinese commercial banks are not considered by the PBC to be yet capable of offering a private market on which those large volumes of foreign currency can be exchanged for renminbi.
Hitherto, China's banking system has lacked derivative markets for currency and debt instruments to do the necessary hedging and it is not sufficiently distant from decades of soft budget constraints associated with the channelling of government subsidies to state-owned enterprises through accumulated debt. This has necessitated the placing of the PBC's US dollar receipts abroad. And, to avoid excess liquidity, these placements have been sterilised.
PBC holdings of domestic credit have been insufficient for this sterilisation, however, so 'sterilisation bonds' have been issued on the debit side of the balance sheet (Table 3) .
Just as the reserves have come to dominate the asset side of the balance sheet, sterilisation bonds have assumed significance on the debit side. In effect, the PBC has acted as a conduit for domestic savers who might otherwise acquire foreign assets but are restricted from doing so by capital controls. The current pressure from abroad to revalue therefore places the PBC in a difficult position for two reasons. First, since the assets of the PBC are primarily in US dollars and its liabilities are in renminbi, too prompt an appreciation of the renminbi would result in substantial losses that would need to be covered in renminbi from the government budget. xxiv Second, and more important, if the path of the underlying real exchange rate is flat (as in Figure 2 ), then from Equation (1), any decision by the PBC to revalue would require further monetary tightening and a reduction in the inflation rate. To May 2007, however, this rate was running at about 3% annually. Any revaluation larger than this would risk a return to the growth-sapping deflation of the late 1990s.
A larger role for the nominal exchange rate must await the fruits of continuing financial reforms and capital market deepening. In the meantime, the control of 'external imbalances' will continue to depend on the management of liquidity growth via limits on base money growth (sterilisation bond issues) and bank reserve requirements, supplemented by more traditionally Chinese instruments, including the rate of public land release, changes in export facilitation and, at least in prospect, the reduction of import tariffs on some luxury products.
Financial reforms are proceeding quickly, however, so that some increased exchange rate flexibility is being offered by the PBC, as suggested by the extension of the daily renminbi-US dollar rate fluctuation bounds from 0.3 per cent to 0.5 per cent as of late May.
Conclusion
The Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis is borne out for China, in that productivity has apparently grown faster in the tradable than in the non-tradable sectors and there has been relative service price inflation. The flat trajectory of its real exchange rate is therefore a puzzle, the resolution of which requires the generalisation of the hypothesis to incorporate failures of the law of one price for tradable goods and a more sophisticated representation of the labour market. This opens the way for depreciating forces that have been offsetting the Balassa-Samuelson effect, including net financial outflows on the balance of payments, trade and other microeconomic reforms, the rising labour force and the rising share of skilled workers.
To examine these forces, a dynamic model of the global economy is used to construct a baseline business-as-usual simulation to 2030. The principal determinants of China's economic growth are then shocked separately and their independent effects on the real exchange rate observed over time. In the short term, the key determinant is net financial capital influx, which appreciates the real exchange rate, or efflux, which depreciates it. In the medium term, scope does emerge for Balassa-Samuelson real appreciation, if services lag sufficiently behind industrial productivity. In the long term, however, if services remain relatively skill intensive on average, their performance will be bolstered by both direct productivity improvements and skill acquisition, and the result will be a substantial depreciating force.
The model is then used to decompose the flat trajectory of the real exchange rate 1997-2006.
The results suggest that the strongest of these forces is the rise of China's total savings relative to its investment and the associated expansion of net outflows on its capital account, with a significant contribution from WTO accession trade reforms. While much attention is paid in the literature to the "undervaluation" of the renminbi, blaming this on China's monetary policy and, in particular, to the PBC's accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, in our view the PBC's monetary stance is necessitated by financial immaturity. In particular, while China's savings exceed its investment, the reserves and capital controls merely alter the public-private composition of external flows but need not significantly affect their magnitudes.
In the long term, since Chinese productivity growth has been higher than that of its trading partners for more than a decade, and considerable scope remains for productivity catch-up in services, the latter could bear down on the real exchange rate. It is difficult to ignore the fact that the majority of the growth-related shocks examined-including overall (and particularly services) productivity growth, professional training and further trade reform-all cause the real exchange rate to depreciate in the long term. Yet, whichever productivity pattern dominates, the future path of the real exchange rate will also depend heavily on financial flows and hence on China's domestic savings relative to its investment. Eventually, its saving rate must fall. When it does, net flows on the capital account will be reversed, resulting in a strong appreciating force. The long-term outcome will then depend on the extent to which this force is offset by continued skill acquisition and services productivity growth. Wang (2004) , Goldstein (2004) , Coudert and Couharde (2005) and .
ii This work draws on some results from . iii Here we imagine that, rather than the continuum of tradability that is observed across goods and services, traded and non-traded goods are separated starkly as T, N. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that services output volumes and prices are measured more poorly than those in merchandise sectors in all countries. These comparative measures therefore carry large error margins. Lu (2006) estimates labour productivity in China's manufacturing and service sectors between 1978 and 2004. He describes the evolution of China's manufacturing labour productivity after 1978 as a two-stage process: during the first stage it was only 1.9 per cent per annum, compared with a per capita GDP growth rate of 7.5 per cent; while during the second stage (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) it increased dramatically, averaging 13.1 per cent-significantly higher than the official per capita GDP growth rate of 8.2 per cent. Labour productivity in the service sector averaged 4.3 per cent per annum for the entire period. Fogel (2006) disaggregates per capita income growth between 1978 and 2002 and shows that 69 per cent of growth was due to increases in labour productivity, which grew most rapidly in industry (6.2 per cent per annum), nearly as high in agriculture (5.7 per cent) and lowest, but still substantial, in services (4.5 per cent). Dixon et al. (1982) ; McKibbin and Sachs (1991); Hertel (1997); and Dixon and Rimmer (2002) . ix Evidence for this is offered by Chang and Tyers (2003) . x Japan is a special case in the East and Southeast Asian experience. It was the first to develop rapidly but its economy, and particularly its services sector, remained far more closed than for its neighbours, and particularly relative to China. xi For example, he calculates that if the tertiary enrolment ratio rose from six to 25 in the next 20 years (putting China where the Western European nations were in 1980), the growth rate of labour productivity would rise by 4.4 per cent between 2000 and 2020, and that this would account for more than 60 per cent of the per capita GDP growth target set in 2002. With the tertiary ratio increasing from 12.5 per cent to 19 per cent between 2000 and 2004, if anything, his estimates could be too conservative.
